Authors: Max Helm, Georg Carle

Authors: Patrick Sattler, Johannes Zirngibl, Mattijs Jonker, Oliver Gasser, Georg Carle, Ralph Holz

Quantum Computers (QCs) differ radically from traditional computers and can efficiently solve mathematical problems fundamental to our current cryptographic algorithms. Although existing QCs need to accommodate more qubits to break cryptographic algorithms, the concern of "Store-Now-Decrypt-Later" (i.e., adversaries store encrypted data today and decrypt them once powerful QCs become available) highlights the necessity to adopt quantum-safe approaches as soon as possible. In this work, we investigate the performance impact of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) on TLS 1.3. Different signature algorithms and key agreements (as proposed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)) are examined through black- and white-box measurements to get precise handshake latencies and computational costs per participating library. We emulated loss, bandwidth, and delay to analyze constrained environments. Our results reveal that HQC and Kyber are on par with our current state-of-the-art, while Dilithium and Falcon are even faster. We observed no performance drawback from using hybrid algorithms; moreover, on higher NIST security levels, PQC outperformed any algorithm in use today. Hence, we conclude that post-quantum TLS is suitable for adoption in today’s systems.

Authors: Markus Sosnowski, Florian Wiedner, Eric Hauser, Lion Steger, Dimitrios Schoinianakis, Sebastian Gallenmüller, Georg Carle

Authors: Florian Wiedner, Alexander Daichendt, Jonas Andre, Georg Carle

Authors: Filip Rezabek, Kilian Glas, Richard Von Seck, Achraf Aroua, Tizian Leonhardt, Georg Carle

Authors: Burak Öz, Filip Rezabek, Jonas Gebele, Felix Hoops, Florian Matthes

Authors: Jonas Andre, Stephan Günther, Georg Carle

Authors: Max Helm, Georg Carle

Authors: Max Helm, Benedikt Jaeger, Christopher Pfefferle, Georg Carle

Authors: Florian Wiedner, Max Helm, Alexander Daichendt, Jonas Andre, Georg Carle